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1. Introduction1
 
On 11 March 2011 a 9.0 magnitude earthquake hit the coast of 
Japan leading to a spectacular tsunami. Already the death toll of 
the tsunami itself made it one of the worst natural disasters in 
the Japanese history.2 In the aftermath of the tsunami a second 
catastrophe hit Japan, since the Fukushima nuclear power plant 
was located in the region of the tsunami (Töhoku), merely 150 
kilometres away from the epicentre of the earthquake. A 13-
15m maximum height tsunami followed the earthquake and ar-
rived at Fukushima, which topped the plant’s 5.7m seawall and 
lead to the failure of the cooling system.3 The equipment failures 
resulted in core melt down and releases of radioactive materials. 
The severity of the nuclear accident is rated 7 on the Interna-
tional Nuclear Event Scale (INES),4 the same as the Chernobyl 
disaster which took place on the 26th of April 1986.
 
This has lead to a strange combination of a natural and a tech-
nological disaster. Whereas nuclear incidents are usually referred 
to as technological (or man made) disasters this time the tech-
1 Michael Faure, Professor of Comparative and International Environmental Law, 
Metro, Maastricht University, Netherlands, email: michael.faure@maastrichtuni-
versity.nl; Professor of Comparative Private Law and Economics, Rotterdam Insti-
tute of Law & Economics, Erasmus University of Rotterdam, Rotterdam, Nether-
lands; and visiting Professor of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 
Philadelphia. 
Jing Liu, Maastricht University, Netherlands, email: jing.liu@maastrichtuniversity.nl.
2 The Japanese National Police Agency has confirmed that by the end of 2011 
there were 15,457 casualties, 5,349 injured and 7,676 persons missing as well as 
over 125,000 buildings damaged or destroyed. See Japanese National Police 
Agency, Damage Situation and Police Countermeasures associated with 2011 To-
hoku district – off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake, http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/
keibi/biki/higaijokyo_e.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2012); Japanese National Police 
Agency, 平 平2平(2011平)平平平平平平平平平平平平平平平平平平平平 平                                       The Damage 
of Tōhoku Earthquake of 2011, http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijo-
kyo.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
3 http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gLKi4UhOU2O4nxE_GI
6ojeeTPU4A?docId=4212f388029744c98fc86d18476fd974. (last visited Mar. 10, 
2012).
4 The INES was introduced in 1990 by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) to communicate to the public the safety significance of nuclear and ra-
diological events. The INES scale explains the significance of events arising from 
a range of activities, such as the industrial and medical use of radiation sources, 
operations at nuclear facilities and transport of radioactive material. Events are 
classified on the scale at seven levels. The severity of an event is about ten times 
greater for each increase in level on the scale. See the website of IAEA: http://
www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/ines.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 
2012).
nological disaster was triggered by a natural disaster (the earth-
quake and the subsequent tsunami). This raises important ques-
tions with respect to the compensation of the victims. In this 
article we will focus on how the victims of Fukushima nuclear 
accidents are compensated and how the liability system can con-
tribute to prevention as well. An important question which will 
of course arise from a legal perspective is to what extent the 
earthquake and following tsunami could be considered as a 
force majeure which would exclude the liability of the operator 
of the nuclear power plant. This requires a detailed analysis of 
the compensation system for nuclear damage in Japan. The 
compensation for nuclear damage in Japan has a few interesting 
characteristics (like unlimited liability and indemnity agree-
ments with the government) which make a further study of this 
model highly interesting, also from an international perspective. 
Also the fact that it is difficult to identify whether it was (only) 
the tidal wave following the earthquake which caused the nucle-
ar incident or also human error raises interesting questions from 
a legal perspective.
 
This paper is structured as follows: after this introduction (1) 
the applicable liability rules are sketched according to the Act on 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage of 1961 (2). Then the fi-
nancing of the nuclear damage via various arrangements is dis-
cussed (3) and this is followed by the way in which victims are 
compensated in the recent Fukushima incident (4). A brief crit-
ical evaluation (5) and a comparison to the international regime 
(6) are provided. Section 7 concludes.
2. Liability rules
 
2.1 Nuclear Energy in Japan
 
Nuclear energy is an important energy source in Japan. It is re-
ported that as of the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, 54 commer-
cial nuclear power plants are operating in Japan with a total li-
censed generating capacity of 48,847 Mwe. That was 
approximately 20% of the total capacity of electric power gen-
eration.5
5 See the website of Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, http://www.jnes.
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mise between the interests involved which is also made clear in 
Article 1 of the Act which holds that the Act aims both at the 
protection of victims as well as at the promotion of the further 




The Act on Compensation stipulates liability for nuclear dam-
age. The term “nuclear damage” is defined as “any damage 
caused by the effects of the fission process of nuclear fuel, or of 
the radiation from nuclear fuel etc. or of the toxic nature of such 
materials”.12 This is broader than the US nuclear liability re-
gime. In the US, the Price-Anderson Act imposes the “public 
liability” for nuclear damage, which means “any liability arising 
out of or resulting from a nuclear incident or precautionary 
evacuation”.13 Under the Japanese regime, there is no require-
ment of a sudden incident. In other words, either damage caused 
by a nuclear incident or gradual damage can be covered under 
the Act on Compensation.
 
2.4 Channelled Strict Liability
 
As in the international regime, a strict liability regime for nucle-
ar damage is established in Japan, and the liability is channeled 
to the nuclear operator.14 However, if the damage is caused by 
the wilful act of a third party, the operator who has compensated 
the damage has a right of recourse against the third party. More-
over, a nuclear operator can enter in to a special agreement with 
any person regarding rights of recourse.15 In other words, 
through a special contractual arrangement, a nuclear operator 
has the possibility to recover the damage from the contractors 
who actually contributed to the risks. If the nuclear damage is 
caused by a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character or 
by an insurrection, the nuclear operator can be exonerated from 
liability.16 The term “an exceptional character” is essential to de-
termine the exoneration of liability. Nuclear operators can still 
be held liable for the nuclear damage caused by some natural 
disaster, such as earthquake or volcanic eruption. He can cover 
such losses through an indemnity agreement with the govern-
ment. In the other words, if the natural disasters cannot be iden-
11 Weitzdörfer, supra note 5, at p. 67-68.
12 Act on Compensation, Section 2 (2).
13 42 U.S.C.A. § 2014 (w).
14 Section 3 of the Act of 1961 makes clear that when nuclear damage occurs, the 
nuclear operator who is engaged in the reactor operation shall be liable for the 
damage. The title mentions that it is a “liability without fault”. Section 4 holds a 
channelling provision which is formulated as follows: “Where nuclear damage is 
covered by the preceding section, no other person other than the nuclear op-
erator who is liable for the damage pursuant to the preceding section shall be 
liable for the damage”. See further Weitzdörfer, supra note 5, at p. 68 and 70.
15 Act on Compensation, section 5.
16 Act on Compensation, section 3.
In a country like Japan, where nuclear energy plays an impor-
tant role, it is interesting to see how the liability system works to 
prevent and compensate nuclear damage. Japan does not par-
ticipate in any international convention on civil liability for 
nuclear damage.6 Japan at the time did not feel the need to join 
the international conventions, since also other major nuclear 
powers (like the US and more recently India and China) were 
not party to the international nuclear liability conventions ei-
ther.7 It established its own national regime through four major 
legislative instruments: the Act on Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage (Act on Compensation), the Order for the Execution 
of the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage (Order on 
Compensation), the Act on Indemnity Agreement for Compen-
sation of Nuclear Damage (Act on Indemnity) and the Order 
for the Execution of the Act on Indemnity Agreement for Com-
pensation of Nuclear Damage (Order on Indemnity).8 A num-
ber of principles of the international third party liability regimes 
are also embodied in those legislations.9
 
2.2 The Act of 1961
 
The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage of 1961 (2009) 
shapes the major structure of the liability rules for nuclear dam-
age and the corresponding financial requirements. The Act on 
Compensation was initially passed in 1961 and recently amend-
ed in 2009. Many different kinds of activities were covered un-
der the Act: reactor operation, production, reprocessing, the use 
of nuclear fuel, storage of spent fuel, and waste disposal of nu-
clear fuel or material contaminated by nuclear fuel.10 The scope 
of the nuclear operation is quite broadly defined: not only nu-
clear reactors, but also many other facilities in the nuclear cycle 
are covered. The Japanese law is the result of a careful compro-
go.jp/english/activity/unkan/e-unkanhp1/e-unkanhp1-2010/book1/book.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
6 Julius Weitzdörfer, ‘Die Haftung für Nuklearschäden nach japanischem Atom-
recht – Rechtsprobleme der Reaktorkatastrofe von Fukushima I’, Zeitschrift für 
Japanisches Recht 31, Journal of Japanese Law, 61, 67 (2011) [Liability for Nuclear 
Damages pursuant to Japanese Atomic Law – Legal Problems Arising from the Fu-
kushima I Nuclear Accident].
7 Telephone Interview with Kunihiko (Kuni) Shimada, special advisor to the minis-
ter of the environment in Japan and chief executive officers of KS International 
Strategies Inc. (Dec. 26 2011).
8 Copies of English translation can be found at the website of NEA, see http://
www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/japan.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
9 The major principles underlying the international nuclear liability conventions 
contain: strict liability, channeling of liability to the nuclear operator, limited 
liability, compulsory insurance, exclusive jurisdiction and public funding. For the 
details of those principles, see Tom Vanden Borre, ‘Nuclear Liability: an Anachro-
nism in EU Energy Policy?’ In: European Energy Law Report VII, p. 184 (Martha M. 
Roggenkamp & Ulf Hammer eds., 2010). Some of those principles are followed 
in Japanese nuclear law, such as strict liability, channeling of liability and com-
pulsory financial coverage. The major difference is that unlimited liability ap-
plies in the Japanese system. The details of those features are discussed in the 
following section.
10 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage (Act No. 147 of 1961), As Amended 
by Act No. 19 of 17 April 2009 [Act on Compensation 2009], Section 2(1).
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the amount is set as 120 billion yen.22 The operator can satisfy 
his financial obligation by using a contract of liability insurance 
for nuclear damage, an indemnity agreement (with the govern-
ment) or a deposit approved by MEXT. If the damage exceeds 
the amount available from financial security mechanisms, the 
government can have the option to provide aids. The use of lia-
bility insurance, the indemnity agreement and governmental 




Liability insurance is the primary instrument to provide finan-
cial security for nuclear damage in Japan. The contract of liabil-
ity insurance for nuclear damage is defined as “the contract un-
der which an insurer undertakes to indemnify a nuclear operator 
for his loss arising from compensating nuclear damage, where 
the nuclear operator becomes liable for such nuclear damage”.23 
A nuclear accident has the potential to create catastrophic losses 
and the amount of financial security required from nuclear op-
erators is also too large for a single insurance company. There-
fore, as is also the practice in other countries, the insurers in Ja-
pan have pooled together to provide insurance coverage for 
nuclear risks. The nuclear liability insurance policy is provided 
by the Japan Atomic Energy Insurance Pool (JAEIP). The pool 
was established in 1960 and is comprised of 32 domestic insur-
ance companies and 11 foreign insurance companies. Different 
from the American nuclear pools, JAEIP provides both a liabil-
ity insurance policy and property damage policies.24
 
Under the liability policy provided by the JAEIP, the coverage 
contains: compensation for nuclear damage, legal expenses (in-
cluding costs for litigation, arbitration, settlement and media-
tion, which is approved by the insurer), the costs of preservation 
of rights and the costs of measures to prevent the expansion of 
damage.25 The insurance policy excludes a few kinds of damage: 
the damage caused intentionally by the insured, a grave natural 
disaster of an exceptional character or by an insurrection, the 
use of atomic energy for non-peaceful purpose, earthquake, fire 
or tsunami; damage to the property owned, used or managed by 
the insured, damage to other property which is located at the 
site of the used in connection with the insured’s facility.26
 
22 Act on Compensation, section 7.1; Order on Compensation, section 2.
23 Act on Compensation, section 8.
24 平平平平, 平平平平平平平平平平平平平平平平, 平平平平平平平平                                                    51(6), 21-47, 30. 
[Oba Hirokazu, ‘Nuclear Damage and Liability insurance for Nuclear damage’, p. 
51, in: Otia University Economic Review, 21, 30 (2000)].
25 Liability insurance for nuclear installations, common clause, 2000 (Clause 2000), 
Article 3. As cited in Oba Hirokazu (2000), supra note 23, at p. 33.
26 Clause 2000, article 7.
tified as of an exceptional nature, the operators are still liable. 
Since insurers usually exclude the damage caused by natural di-
sasters from liability insurance policies, this kind of risk is cov-
ered by an indemnity agreement concluded with the govern-
ment.17
 
2.5 Limits and Dispute Reconciliation Committee
 
A major difference between the Japanese regime and the inter-
national regime is that in Japan the liability of the nuclear op-
erator is unlimited.18 Although there is a ceiling for the require-
ment of financial security that has to be provided by the operator, 
he is still liable for damage in excess of this ceiling. The details 
of the financial security are discussed in the following subsec-
tion.
 
In case of a nuclear accident, the Dispute Reconciliation Com-
mittee for Nuclear Damage Compensation (hereinafter Recon-
ciliation Committee) may be established as an organization at-
tached to the Minister for Education, Culture, Sport, Science 
and Technology (MEXT). The Reconciliation Committee “shall 
be in charge of mediating reconciliation of any dispute arising 
from compensation of nuclear damage and of preparing general 
instructions to help operators reach a voluntary settlement of 
such disputes”.19 To establish such a Reconciliation Committee 
is a usual practice in Japan in compensating nuclear damage. 
For example, after both the Tokai-Mura Accident in 1999 and 
the Fukushima accident, a Reconciliation Committee was es-
tablished to deal with the compensation.20
3. Financing of the Compensation
 
Nuclear damage may turn out to be catastrophic, which can 
dwarf the financial capacity of the liable operators. Thus finan-
cial security provided by operators can be used to guarantee the 
availability of a certain level of assets in case of damage. The Act 
on Compensation imposes obligations on the nuclear operators 
to provide financial security up to a certain level.21 The financial 
security is set from 4 billion yen to 120 billion yen, depending 
on different types of installations. For the nuclear power plants, 
17 See Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage (Act 
No. 148 of 1961), As Amended by Act No. 19 of 17 April 2009, Section 3.
18 Weitzdörfer, supra note 5, at p. 70-71.
19 Act on Compensation, section 18 (1).
20 On the Tokai-mura accident, see Secretariat of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 
‘Tokai-Mura Accident, Japan, Third Party Liability and Compensation Aspects’, in: 
Indeminification of damage in the event of a nuclear accident, p. 127, 129 (OECD, 
2003). For the Fukushima accident, see the website of Japanese Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nucle-
ar/pdf/20110512_provisional_payment_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
21 Act on Compensation, section 6.
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amount available for indemnifying is insufficient at the time the 
indemnity fee is paid.33 The operators are imposed an obligation 
to notify the government of some specific issues.34 The govern-
ment has the right to cancel the indemnity agreement if the 




The Act on Compensation requires operators to provide finan-
cial security up to the amount of 120 billion yen. However, a 
catastrophic nuclear damage can turn out to lead to much high-
er damage than that amount. When such damage happens, the 
government shall give a nuclear operator aid needed for com-
pensation if the government deems it necessary. Such aid should 
be given to the extent authorized by the National Diet.36 When 
the damage is caused by a grave natural disaster of an excep-
tional character or by an insurrection, the government shall take 
the necessary steps to relieve victims and to prevent the damage 
from spreading.37 Unlike under the indemnity agreement, un-
der which the actual rights and obligations of the government 
and the operator have been clearly established and the indem-
nity amount is determined ex ante, how aid will be arranged in 
these cases is not clear and is to a large extent determined ad hoc 
by the government. Besides, the operators do not have to pay a 
price for such aids. 
 
The compensation system, also taking into account the case of a 
natural disaster, can hence be summarized as follows:
33 Order on Indemnity, section 3.
34 Different notification requirements are set for different kinds of indemnity 
agreements, such as for the indemnity agreement relating to reactor operation, 
that relating to production, reprocessing, the use of nuclear fuel, and so on. For 
example, in the indemnity agreement relating to the reactor operation, the nu-
clear operator needs to notify the Government the following issues: the use of 
the nuclear reactor, type, the thermal rating and number of nuclear reactors; 
name and address of the installations or sites equipped with a nuclear reactor; 
location, structure and equipment of the building housing the nuclear reactor, 
types and quantity of the nuclear materials to be used as fuel in the nuclear 
reactor; method of disposing of spent fuel and information about the liability 
insurance contract. See Order on Indemnity, section 4.
35 Act on Indemnity, section 15; Order on Indemnity, section 9.
36 Act on Compensation, section 16.
37 Act on Compensation, section 17.
3.2 Indemnity Agreements
 
To compensate for the damage which is not covered by liability 
insurance or other means of financial security, a nuclear opera-
tor can conclude an indemnity agreement with the government. 
The Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of Nucle-
ar Damage (the Act on Indemnity Agreements) and the Order 
for the Execution of the Act on Indemnity Agreements for 
Compensation of Nuclear Damage (the Order on Indemnity 
Agreements) lay down the rules for indemnity agreements. 
 
Nuclear damage caused by natural disasters is less predictable 
for insurers. Therefore it is excluded from insurance coverage in 
Japan. Besides, nuclear damage has a long tail feature: some-
times the damage only appears decades after the accident and 
exposure to radiation. The long tail characteristic poses a chal-
lenge to the insurance market, which often only covers damage 
that happens within ten years after the occurrence of the nuclear 
event. This is also the case in Japan.27 However, in Japan, the 
prescription period is 20 years after the data on which the tort 
occurred.28 Damage caused by natural disaster and damage 
claimed beyond a period of ten years from the day of the occur-
rence of an event are covered in the indemnify agreements. In 
addition, the indemnity loss contains also nuclear damage 
caused by the normal operation and other damage provided in 
the Cabinet Order.29 Other damage provided in the Cabinet 
Order refers to the damage resulting from a tidal wave. In other 
words, the damage resulting from a tidal wave is not covered by 
insurance, but it is covered under the indemnity agreement with 
the government.30
 
The indemnity agreement amount should be the required 
amount of the financial security (reduced by the amount avail-
able by other means or other indemnity agreements).31 The pe-
riod of the indemnity agreement is from the time of its conclu-
sion to the time when the reactor operation has ceased.32 To seek 
the coverage of an indemnity agreement, the operator has to pay 
an indemnity fee as the price. The indemnity fee is determined 
by multiplying the indemnity agreement amount by the rate 
provided in the Order. According to the order that rate shall be 
3 (indemnity fee) for 10, 000 (amount being indemnified) or 
1.5 for 10, 000 for the reactor in universities and technical col-
leges. The rate can be increased ex post by the government if the 
27 Clause 2000, article 8.
28 Civil Code (Act No. 89 of 1896), section 724. Unofficial English translation avail-
able at: http://www.tomeika.jur.kyushu-u.ac.jp/transaction/legislation/civil_
code.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
29 Act on Indemnity, section 3.
30 Order on Indemnity, section 2.
31 Act on Indemnity, section 4.
32 Act on Indemnity, section 5.
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ing hydrogen explosions and leaking of cooling water.41 GE has 
been criticized for its design, that is vulnerable to earthquake 
and flooding risks. According to the design, the reactor’s energy 
diesel generators and DC batteries were located in the base-
ments of the reactor turbine buildings, which was flooded be-
cause of the tsunami. It was reported that mid-level engineers 
working on the construction of the plant were concerned with 
the vulnerability to floods of the back up power systems.42 It is 
also reported that GE was warned of the major design flaws in 
1976.43 TEPCO chose to follow GE’s design in the construction 
strictly. To comply with new regulatory requirements, three ad-
ditional backup generators were placed in the building located 
high in the late 1990s. However, the switching stations that 
connect the generators and reactors cooling systems were still in 
poorly protected turbine buildings. It is argued that if the 
switching stations had been moved inside the reactor buildings, 
the failure of the cooling system would not have happened.44 
How the nuclear damage resulting from this catastrophe will be 
compensated raises serious concerns.
4.2 The Scope of Compensable Damage 
 
The nuclear accident developed quickly in the early weeks after 
the earthquake and tsunami. The nuclear accident led to sub-
stantial third party damage. According to the Act on Compen-
sation, the nuclear operator faces unlimited strict liability and 
he has the obligation to seek financial security up to 120 billion 
yen. If the damage is caused by an earthquake or volcanic erup-
tion, the government should indemnify the loss until it reaches 
120 billion yen through the indemnity agreement with govern-
ment. For damage in excess of this amount, the operator is still 
liable. However, if such a natural disaster is determined as “a 
grave natural disaster of an exceptional character”, the liable 
parties can be exonerated from liability. To apply those liability 
rules to the Fukushima accident, whether TEPCO will face sub-
stantial liability depends on whether the accident will be attrib-
uted to “a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character”.45 
41 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_nuclear_disaster#cite_ref-41 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
42 http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110713x1.html (last visited Mar. 10, 
2012).
43 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_nuclear_disaster#cite_ref-41 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
44 Norihiko Shirouzu & Chester Dawson, Design Flaw Fueled Nuclear Disaster: http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304887904576395580035481822.
html (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
45 The issue of whether the Fukushima incident considered such a grave natural 
disaster of an exceptional character is as yet undecided. See Weitzdörfer, supra 
note 5, at p. 76-77. Some hold that TEPCO was aware of the danger of an earth-
quake which could lead to a nuclear incident since several experts had provided 
warnings in that respect. This would be an argument to hold that the earth-
quake had no exceptional character. On the other hand, the earthquake with a 
magnitude of 9.0 was the strongest so far in Japan as a result of which the ques-
tion could arise what would then still be necessary to qualify as “a grave natural 
disaster of an exceptional character”.
 Table 1: Liability in case of a nuclear accident in Japan38
4. Case Study: the Fukushima Accident
 
4.1 A Brief Introduction to the Fukushima Disaster
 
The Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant is a plant consisting of six 
boiling water reactors which are designed by General Electric 
(GE), and maintained by the Tokyo Electric Power Company 
(TEPCO). After the 9.0 magnitude earthquake hit Japan on 11 
March 2011, the reactors Units 1, 2 and 3 were shut down au-
tomatically. The other three units had been shut down prior to 
the earthquake for planned maintenance. After the shutdown of 
the nuclear reactors, there was still decay heat from the radioac-
tive decay of the unstable isotopes. Nuclear fuel rods require 
several years of water cooling in a spent fuel pool before decay 
heat production reduces to the point that they can be safely 
transferred to dry storage casks.39 Cooling pumps can be pow-
ered by other units on-site, by other units of-site through the 
grid or by diesel generators or steam-turbine driven emergency 
core cooling systems to circulate cooling water when the reactor 
is shut down. After the 11 March earthquake and the following 
tsunami, the plant stopped generating electricity, stopping the 
normal source of power. The tsunami lead to a flood in the base-
ment of the Turbine Buildings and disabled the emergency die-
sel generators located there.40 The failure of the cooling system 
subsequently led to the full meltdown in reactors 1, 2 and 3. A 
series of accidents was reported in the following weeks, includ-
38 Weitzdörfer, supra note 5, at p. 75.
39 http://www.somdnews.com/stories/03232011/rectop133917_32384.shtml. (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2012).
40 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_nuclear_disaster#cite_ref-41 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
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ficulties in proving negligence or because of the remoteness of the 
economic loss.50 Besides, even for personal injury, the causation is 
not always easy to be established due to scientific uncertainties. 
Those hurdles may not be easy to overcome in the tort system, but 
can be easier solved in the administrative system.
 
In addition to personal injury, property damage and economic 
losses which often draw more attention in case of a nuclear acci-
dent, serious environmental damage can also arise from such an 
accident. The building, soil and vegetation may be exposed to high 
radiation spread by the accident and create a further threat for hu-
man health. The Fukushima accident is classified as INES level 7, 
which means that it creates significant off site impacts and environ-
mental damage. However, as shown above, the compensable dam-
age determined by the Dispute Reconciliation Committee makes 
no direct reference to the concept “environmental damage”.
 
A specific act was enacted on August 26, 2011 to address the de-
contamination of the damaged environment: the “Act on Special 
Measures concerning the Handling of Environmental Pollution by 
Radioactive Materials Discharged by NPS Associated with the To-
hoku District-Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake that Occurred on 
March 11, 2011”.51 The act gives a framework of decontamination 
measures for the pollution caused by the Fukushima accident with 
the involvement of national government, local government and 
nuclear operators. It is worth noting that rather than restoring and 
compensating for the damage to the environment itself, this act 
focuses on reducing the influence of environmental pollution on 
human health and the living environment.52 In the other words, 
this act does not aim at providing complete compensation for the 
environment; only the measures related to reducing human impacts 
are covered. The national government is responsible for setting de-
contamination policies and take measures itself. Local governments 
shall cooperate with the national government and shall also take 
some initiatives themselves. Nuclear operators shall dispose the ra-
dioactive wastes and cooperate with the government to decontami-
nate the polluted environment. The financial duty to take care of 
the decontamination of the polluted environment is formulated in 
the recent act as an obligation of various stakeholders.53 The act 
inter alia provides that national government and local public au-
thorities shall take financial measures and other measures to pro-
50 Yoshihisa Nomi, ‘Tort Liability for Pure Economic Loss in Japan’, in: Japanese Re-
ports for the XVII International Congress of Comparative Law, (Utrecht, 16-22 July 
2006), available at: http://www2.law.uu.nl/priv/AIDC/PDF%20files/IIA5/IIA5%20
-%20Japan.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
51 http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/shiryo/__icsFiles/
afieldfile/2011/09/21/1311103_13_2.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
52 Article 1.
53 See articles 43-45 of the Act on Special Measures concerning the handling of 
environmental pollution by radioactive materials discharged by MPS associated 
with the Tohoku-district of the Pacific Ocean earthquake that occurred on 
March 11, 2011.
The Japanese government did not admit the earthquake and tsu-
nami to be of an “exceptional character”. On the contrary, the 
government requires TEPCO to compensate the damage it 
caused. Several provisional payments of nuclear damage com-
pensation have been made by TEPCO until now.46 To investi-
gate the impact of the Fukushima accident and ascertain the 
compensable damage, the Dispute Reconciliation Committee 
for Nuclear Damage Compensation has been established. The 
Reconciliation Committee has published a preliminary guid-
ance, secondary guidance with an added guidance, and interim 
guidance with an added guidance on the scope of compensable 
damage.47 It defined the compensable damage according to ter-
ritorial zones. The determination of compensable damage also 
took into account the compensation for the Tokai-mura acci-
dent and whether the compensable losses were similar.48 Accord-
ing to the government guidance, TEPCO also stipulates the 
standards for compensation for those different categories.49
 
It is worth noting that the compensable damage determined by the 
Dispute Reconciliation Committee in Japan is quite broad. It does 
not only allow compensation for personal damage and property 
damage but also for some pure economic loss. For example, under 
the title of business damage, damage due to rumors and indirect 
damage, physical damage is not a necessary requirement for award-
ing damages. In response to the nuclear damage, Japan chose an 
administrative system rather than a judicial system as the primary 
compensation instrument. Compensation is awarded according to 
different areas and government orders. The standards to indentify 
compensable losses are also set by the administrative authority. This 
approach can avoid the substantial hurdles in the tort system in 
awarding compensation for nuclear damage. Though in the Act on 
Compensation no specific hurdles have been introduced in the es-
tablishment of nuclear liability, some general obstacles in the tort 
system may still prevent sufficient compensation for nuclear vic-
tims. For example, in Japanese law, there is no general rule which 
bars the recovery of pure economic loss. However, in practice the 
claim for pure economic loss is not easy, either because of the dif-
46 http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/pdf/20110614_
damage_corporation_2.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
47 The preliminary guidance was made on 28th April; the secondary guidance was 
made on 31st May, and added guidance was made on 20th June, interim guid-
ance was made on 5th of August, and the added guidance on interim guidance 
on 6th of December. For the content of guidance (Japanese), See http://www.
mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/index.htm(last visited Mar. 10, 
2012).; http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/shiryo/__
icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/12/06/1313895_1_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
48 Interim Guidance on the Determination of Compensation Scope for Fukushima 
Accident, available:
 http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/houkoku/__ics-
Files/afieldfile/2011/08/17/1309452_1_2.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
49 http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/
images/110830e19.pdf; http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/
betu11_e/images/110921e13.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
80 TGMA |  JUNI  2012
tion facilitation corporation (the Corporation) and a system of 
financing the compensation for damage. The Corporation will 
receive contributions from nuclear operators as the cost required 
for the operation of the Corporation, and reserve funds in prep-
aration for compensation.58 The victims still need to claim from 
the liable operator and the liable operator needs to make the 
payment to the victims. However, the Corporation can facilitate 
the compensation and provide the necessary information and 
advice in response to the affected people’s consultation.59 If the 
liable operator needs assistance, the Corporation can provide 
two forms of assistance: the ordinary financial assistance which 
needs the resolution of the management committee of the Cor-
poration, and special financial assistance which needs to be ap-
proved by the competent minister. Under the special financial 
assistance, the Corporation and the operator need to formulate 
a special business plan. Under this plan, the government will 
issue government bonds to the Corporation and the Corpora-
tion will grant the necessary funds to the nuclear operator. The 
Corporation can also get support from financial institutions, 
which can be guaranteed by the government. After getting the 
financial support from the government and financial institu-
tions, the liable nuclear operator will pay special contributions 
to the Corporation. Other nuclear operators also need to pay 
general contributions based on the principle of “mutual sup-
port”. From the contributions, the corporation will make repay-
ments to the national treasury and financial institutions. One 
issue worth noting here is that the Corporation does not only 
provide assistance for the compensation of third party damage, 
but also for the expenditures to deal with the nuclear disaster 
and facility investment to sustain a stable supply of electricity.60 
The compensation under the new system can be summarized as 
follows:
  
Table 2: Compensation support by Nuclear Damage Compen-
sation Facilitation Corporation61
58 Outline of the bill of the Act to Establish Nuclear Damage Compensation Facili-
tation Corporation, supra note 55, p. 1.
59 Id, p. 3.
60 Outline of the bill of the Act to Establish Nuclear Damage Compensation Facili-
tation Corporation (tentative).
 Outline of the bill of the Act to Establish Nuclear Damage Compensation Facili-
tation Corporation, supra note 55.
61 http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/pdf/20111012_
nuclear_damages_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
mote the policies related with the handling of the environmental 
pollution by radioactive materials discharged by the accident. How-
ever, the act equally makes clear that also the liable nuclear opera-
tors shall compensate within their capacity. Experts on nuclear law 
in Japan also confirm that on the basis of the new act the financing 
of the decontamination is considered as a joint responsibility of the 
operators, the national government and local public authorities.54
 
4.3 Financing of the Compensation 
 
Besides the scope of compensable damage, another related ques-
tion is how this catastrophic damage can be financed. As was 
indicated above, nuclear damage caused by a natural disaster is 
excluded from the insurance policy provided by JAEIP. Thus the 
insurance industry does not seem to be seriously impacted by 
this accident. The government may have to indemnify the losses 
up to 120 billion yen. However the remainder of the damage 
may still create a challenge to the financial capacity of TEPCO. 
According to the Act on Compensation, if the operator’s liabil-
ity exceeds the amount of financial security and the government 
deems it necessary in order to attain the objectives of the act, the 
government shall give aid to the operator.55 The aid typically 
includes financial assistance such as a subsidy, low-interest spe-
cial loans and interest aids. However, whether and to which ex-
tent aids will be given depends on the government’s decision. 
Since the significant impact of the Fukushima accident and the 
catastrophic nature of the damage, it will be difficult for TEP-
CO alone to provide full compensation. To ensure a prompt 
compensation of the damage caused by the Fukushima accident, 
the government has prepared an Act on compensation since 
June 2011. The Act to Establish Nuclear Damage Compensa-
tion Facilitation Corporation was passed on 3 August, 2011.56 
The act has three aims: ensuring the prompt and proper nuclear 
damage compensation for affected people, stabilization of the 
nuclear power station and the prevention of adverse effects on 
business operators and the stable supply of electricity.57 To real-
ize those aims, the act establishes a nuclear damage compensa-
54 Telephone interview with Mr. Kuni Shimada (Dec. 26, 2011).
55 Act on Compensation, section 16.
56 Japan’s parliament approves TEPCO compensation plan, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/business-14383832 (last visited Mar. 10, 2012);English summary of the act: 
Outline of the bill of the Act to Establish Nuclear Damage Compensation Facili-
tation Corporation (tentative),
 http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/pdf/20110614_
damage_corporation_2.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2012); 
 Outline of the bill of the Act to Establish Nuclear Damage Compensation Facili-
tation Corporation , http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/road-
map/pdf/20110614_damage_corporation_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2012); Full 
content of the act (Japanese):
 http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/taiou_honbu/pdf/songai-
baisho_110614_03.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
57 The Act to Establish Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation, 
article 1.
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A positive feature of the compensation system in Japan is un-
doubtedly the unlimited liability of the operator of the nuclear 
power plant. International conventions and many national laws 
often have so-called financial caps on the liability of the nuclear 
operator which is hence qualified as a subsidy.67 However, it is 
not so clear to what extent the unlimited liability truly leads to 
a full externalization of the nuclear accident costs. In a recent 
article Mark Ramseyer is very critical and holds that earthquakes 
are so common in Japan that TEPCO basically decided to build 
its reactor at the site which is vulnerable to earthquake risks 
because it would not pay the full costs of a meltdown anyway.68 
He holds that a nuclear operator is, also under the Japanese sys-
tem, still able to externalize liability since liability will de facto 
still be capped at the value of its assets.
 
One particular striking aspect of the Fukushima case is of course 
that TEPCO had apparently placed its back-up generators in 
the basement of the turbine building, as a result of which the 
nuclear power plant would be without a cooling system in case 
of a disaster. It may not immediately be clear to what extent this 
can be blamed either to TEPCO itself as operator or to General 
Electric, who designed the Fukushima plant. If it would be held 
that the wrongful placement was due to negligence on the side 
of General Electric a painful aspect of the nuclear liability re-
gime (in Japan, but also worldwide) becomes clear, being the 
channelling of liability: according to the Japanese Act on Com-
pensation only the operator of the nuclear power plant can be 
held liable, thus excluding liability of other potential parties that 
contributed to the risk, like in this particular case perhaps Gen-
eral Electric. This channelling of liability has been largely criti-
cized in the literature.69 The economic literature argues that 
nuclear suppliers, transporters and other parties may also be re-
sponsible for nuclear damage. Since some of these parties, espe-
cially the transporters, may have serious risks of insolvency, a 
proposal was made to make operators and suppliers (transport-
ers) jointly and severally liable. Under such a proposal, the insol-
vency problem would be alleviated and those other parties will 
have incentives for mutual monitoring.70
ing Amakudari: What do we know and how do we know it?’, 31 Journal of Japa-
nese Studies 385 (2005).
67 On this subsidy, See Michael G. Faure & Karine Fiore, ‘An Economic Analysis of a 
Nuclear Liability Subsidy’, 26 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 419 (2009).
68 For an analysis of this accident see J. Mark Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build 
Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of Japan 1, p. 18-19 (Harvard John M. 
Olin Centre for Law, Economics and Business, Disc. Paper No. 698, 2011), avail-
able at: http://www.law.harvard.edu/program/olin_centre (last visited Mar. 10, 
2012).
69 See Tom Vanden Borre, ‘Channeling of Liability: A Few Juridical and Economic 
Views on an Inadequate Legal Construction’, in: Contemporary developments in 
nuclear energy law: harmonizing legislation in CEEC/NIS p. 13-39 (Nathalie L.J.D. 
Horbach ed., 1999).
70 Akihiro Watabe, ‘An Economic Analysis of Nuclear Accidents in Japan’, in: Per-
spectives on international state and local economics, p. 209, 225 (Gerald V. Liu ed., 
This act established a mutual support pooling system to provide 
coverage for nuclear liability after the Fukushima accident. 
Pooling has been advised by some scholars as a useful instru-
ment to finance the catastrophic losses and at the same time not 
to dilute the preventive incentives.62 However, the mutual sup-
port system established in Japan has some characteristics differ-
ent from the practice in other Jurisdictions. In both Germany 
and the US, where a pooling between nuclear operators has 
been established, the pooling was made before an accident hap-
pened. However, the ex post established system can not create 
incentives among operators to monitor each other. Moreover, 
under the Japanese system, the Corporation is not only financed 
by nuclear operators, but also through government compensa-
tion bonds and government guaranteed bonds. If those funds 
are financed without a market price, this system will be more 
like a bailout of TEPCO rather than a pooling system to prevent 
and compensate for future damage. It has to be admitted that 
this plan has lead to much criticism: some doubt that if the 
government support is not registered as a loan on TEPCO’s bal-
ance sheet, the tax payers will ultimately bear the risk; there is 
also concern about nuclear safety which may be compromised as 
a price for cutting costs for TEPCO in the following years.63 
Others even doubt whether TEPCO is still worth continuing to 
exist at all.64
5. A Critical Evaluation
 
The Japanese system for compensation of nuclear damage has a 
few striking features which also result from the fact that they did 
not join any of the international conventions. The imposition of 
a strict liability regime for nuclear accidents is certainly in line 
with suggestions in that respect in (law and economics) litera-
ture.65 However, it is clear that the Act on Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage had, as the Act states itself, mainly as goal to 
reconcile the interests of potential victims and the nuclear in-
dustry. There is according to the literature a long tradition of 
interconnections between industry and bureaucracy in Japan as 
a result of which it should be no surprise that the nuclear indus-
try has been successful in communicating its wishes to the legis-
lator.66
62 See Michael G. Faure & Tom Vanden Borre, ‘Compensating Nuclear Damage: A 
Comparative Economic Analysis of the US and International Liability Schemes’, 
Volume 33, p. 267-268, 277-278; WM & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 219; Norbert 
Pelzer, ‘International Pooling of Operators’ Funds: An Option to Increase the 
Amount of Financial Security to Cover Nuclear Liability?’, Volume 79, p. 46-49 
Nuclear Law Bulletin 37 (2007).
63 http://www.economist.com/node/21536600 (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
64 http://www.japantoday.com/category/commentary/view/should-tepco-contin-
ue-to-exist (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
65 See Michael G. Faure & Roger Van den Bergh, ‘Liability for Nuclear Accidents in 
Belgium from an Interest Group Perspective’, 10 Int’l Rev. L. & Rev. 241 (1990).
66 On these relations between industry and bureaucracy, See W. Grimes, ‘Reassess-
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Japan adopted some similar principles as those of the interna-
tional regimes of nuclear liability, such as strict liability, chan-
nelling of liability to operators and compulsory financial secu-
rity. But there are many differences as well. 
The first difference lies in the definition of nuclear damage and 
the use of the administrative system. The international regime 
gives a more detailed definition of nuclear damage. For example, 
under the second generation of nuclear liability conventions, 
nuclear damage contains loss of life or personal injury, property 
damage, consequential economic loss from personal injury and 
property damage, costs of environment reinstatement, loss of 
income from use or enjoyment of the environment and the costs 
of preventive measures.75 However, in Japan, the definition 
about nuclear damage is quite simple and is silent on what type 
of damage is compensable.76 Thus what composes “nuclear dam-
age” depends on the general tort rules and the application in 
practice. In Japan the judicial system is not that favourable to 
nuclear victims because of the difficulties in proving causation 
and the judges’ favourable attitude towards the nuclear industry, 
as discussed above. On the contrary, most disputes are solved 
through negotiations and settlements under guidance of the ad-
ministrative system. The Dispute Reconciliation Committee 
plays an important role in determining the scope of compens-
able damage. The question can be asked whether compensating 
victims via such an administrative system takes place on the ba-
sis of specific criteria and hence leads to predictability of the 
compensation. When looking at the compensation experiences 
for nuclear damage in Japan, one can find consistency in the 
determinations by the Dispute Reconciliation Committee. Dur-
ing the compensation for damage for the JCO and Fukushima 
accidents, the Committee adopted similar standards in award-
ing the compensation. The compensable scope in the Fukushi-
ma accident is broader, but this is understandable since the lat-
ter has a much more significant off site impact and experience is 
still aggregated during the compensation process. If the admin-
istrative system keeps operating consistently and develops pre-
dictable and clear standards in determining the compensable 
damage, the administrative system can even ensure better com-
pensation for nuclear victims and give the nuclear industry per-
haps more incentives to internalize their full costs than the tort 
system. A predictable administrative compensation system is 
possible in Japan. Actually, Japan has a long history in compen-
sating pollution victims through an administrative system.77 Ad-
mittedly, the administrative scheme may not always guarantee 
75 2004 Paris Convention, Article I (vii). 
76 Act on compensation, section 2 (2).
77 For the introduction of the administrative compensation scheme for pollution 
victims in Japan, see A. Morishima, ‘Environmental Liability in Japan’, in: Modern 
trends in tort law, Dutch and Japanese law compared, p. 183, 191-193 (Ewoud 
Hondius ed. 1999).
 
A critical analysis of the development of the nuclear industry 
has shown that the lacking safety of the nuclear industry in Ja-
pan can be explained from a private interest perspective. As dis-
cussed earlier, since nuclear operators are protected under the 
principle of limited liability in corporate law, they only have to 
pay for the potential losses up to their own assets. Thus TEPCO 
has chosen to build their reactors at the sites vulnerable to earth-
quake risks. The question can then be asked why government 
has allowed such a choice of site and failed to order a more tsu-
nami-resistant construction and renovation. The bureaucrats 
and politicians are supposed to serve the public interest and 
guarantee a better nuclear safety. However, this is not always the 
case. The bureaucrats are also profit maximisers and seek their 
own benefits. Nuclear regulation is public good for the public 
who needs better nuclear safety, but it is a private good for the 
nuclear industry. Thus the nuclear industry has more incentives 
than the public to lobby for lax oversight.71 Considering the 
inefficiency of limited liability under the private ownership of 
nuclear installations, government ownership might be an alter-
native. However, literature also shows that government owner-
ship may be inefficient as a result of regulated electricity prices, 
Not In My Back Yard policy and the progressive tax regime.72
6. Comparison to the International Regime
 
Two international treaty regimes regulate the civil liability for 
damage caused by nuclear accidents.73 The first treaty regime 
was established under the auspices of the OECD NEA and con-
sists of the convention on third party liability in the field of 
nuclear energy of 29 July 1960 (the Paris Convention) and the 
Brussels Supplementary Convention to the Paris Convention 
on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 31 
January 1963 (the Brussels Supplementary Convention). The 
second nuclear liability treaty regime was developed under the 
auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): 
the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
of 21 May 1963. The international regime is characterized by a 
strict liability of the operator, a strict channelling of liability of 
the operator, a financial limit (cap) on liability, compulsory in-
surance and government support. These international regimes 
have been commented on in detail in legal literature and have 
also been the subject of a lot of critique.74
 
2006).
71 Ramseyer, supra note 67, at p. 19.
72 Id, 23.
73 See: Nuclear Energy Agency, Liability and compensation for nuclear damage: an 
international overview (OECD 1994).
74 See Tom Vanden Borre, ‘Shifts in Governance in Compensation for Nuclear Dam-
age: 20 Years after Chernobyl’, in: Shifts in compensation for environmental dam-
age, p. 261 (Michael Faure & Albert Verheij eds., 2007).
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internalization. However, the amount of 120 billion yen set in 
the Japanese system is dwarfed by the huge damage caused by 
the Fukushima accident. The analysis based on a private interest 
approach has shown that government and judges may not have 
incentives to impose a stringent nuclear liability on operators. 
Nevertheless, the Fukushima accident shows that it remains im-
portant to set the financial security at a sufficiently high level to 
cover the total accident costs.
 
Thirdly, as far as the financing is concerned, Japan also seems to 
do better than the international regime. Currently, of the total 
amount available under the international regime, for example in 
France € 381 million, only € 91 million would consist of opera-
tor’s liability, whereas the remaining € 290 million would con-
sist of state aid.79 In Japan this amount of 120 billion yen is in 
principle paid by the operator, either (in the general case) via 
liability insurance or, in case of uninsurable risks (more particu-
larly damage resulting from earthquakes, tsunamis or volcanoes) 
via an indemnity agreement with the government. But the in-
demnity agreement is, unlike the state aid in the international 
regime, not a subsidy, since the operator has to pay a fee for the 
coverage provided by government via the indemnity agreement. 
Of course one could question whether the fee paid by the op-
erator via the indemnity agreement is comparable to commer-
cially risk dependent premiums that would be charged on a 
commercial insurance market. One report shows that in 1998, 
the premium rate was set at 7.9 percent of the coverage,80 which 
is substantially higher than the rate of the indemnity fee (0.3% 
or 0.15%). However, it should be borne in mind that given the 
lack of actuarial data for nuclear accidents, the commercial pre-
mium is usually set higher than the actuarial premium. Thus the 
difference between the rate of indemnity fee and actuarial pre-
mium may not be that large. On the positive side, at least in 
Japan some money is asked from the operator for the govern-
ment indemnity, whereas in the international regime the state 
aid is provided for free. Therefore less subsidy is given under the 
Japanese system. Moreover, unlike in the international regime 
there is in Japan in principle unlimited liability of the operator 
also above the amount of 120 billion yen, for which the opera-
tor needs to seek either liability insurance or an indemnity 
agreement. Hence, the Japanese system has less of a subsidy ef-
fect than the international regime and hence better prospects of 
cost internalization by the operator.
 
It is worth noting that the advantages of the Japanese system in 
financing compared to the international regimes do not mean 
79 Even after the entry into force of the modification protocol of 2004, of the total 
amount of € 1.5 billion only € 700 million would be operator’s liability and a 
remaining € 800 million would still be state aid.
80 Akihiro Watabe, supra note 69, 222.
efficient compensation. The investigation procedure needs to be 
more transparent and the standards used to indentify compens-
able damage need to be consistent. Hence, some combined use 
of the administrative system and the tort system in Japan may 
be desirable.
 
Japan also channelled the liability to the operator of the nuclear 
power plant. This channelling only takes place under the Act on 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage of 1961. However, unlike 
in the international regime there may still be other possibilities 
in Japanese law which could lead to the liability of either the 
operator or other liable parties in addition to the liability based 
on the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage.78 Moreover, 
the Fukushima case provides an excellent example of the prob-
lematic nature of the channelling of liability. The first reports on 
the Fukushima case made clear that the meltdown of the nucle-
ar reactors may have been caused by the simple fact that the 
generators for the cooling system were located in the basement 
of the turbine buildings, which of course made them very vul-
nerable to a tsunami. The question could be asked whether this 
is indeed the result of an action of the operator TEPCO or rath-
er a result of a wrongful design by General Electric. In the latter 
case a channelling of the liability to the operator TEPCO would 
be particularly problematic since channelling would lead to an 
exclusion of liability of all other parties who contributed to the 
risk, in this particular case (at least potentially) General Electric. 
Channelling may thus negatively affect incentives of other par-
ties involved in the risk. In that sense the Fukushima case can 
once more provide an important back up for the general criti-
cism formulated on channelling.
 
As to the second aspect, the amount of compensation, the Japa-
nese regime set the required financial security at 120 billion yen. 
Under the international regime the total amount available (in-
cluding state aid) was € 381 million under the old regime and 
will merely be € 1.5 billion when the modification protocol of 
the Paris and Brussels Convention of 2004 would enter into 
force. Thus the amount in Japan is set substantially higher than 
the first generation of the international regime, but similar to 
the second generation of the international regime and lower 
than the US regime. As discussed above, though no preset cap 
on liability exists in the Act on Compensation, the limited lia-
bility under corporate law may prevent the nuclear industry to 
internalize the full costs they cause. Under this situation, suffi-
cient financial security is necessary to guarantee efficient costs 
78 For a detailed analysis of the other potential sources of liability under Japanese 
Law, see Weitzdörfer, supra note 5, at p. 87-101. There may for example still be 
claims possible on the basis of property law, but also under labour law or social 
security law. Also the possibility of state liability can still be examined, according 
to Weitzdörfer.
84 TGMA |  JUNI  2012
The operator’s duty to seek financial guarantees up to a certain 
amount is supplemented with unlimited liability. Moreover, the 
indemnity agreement with the government involves the pay-
ment of a fee by the operator for the compensation that will be 
provided by government. This provides the important lesson 
that state intervention in the compensation of catastrophes 
should not (as is often the case) be provided for free. Charging a 
price for government intervention has the major advantage that 
a subsidy-effect is avoided and that a better cost internalization 
can take place.
 
Of course questions can still be asked about whether either the 
compensation system for nuclear liability will be able to provide 
full compensation to the victims. It may, as yet, be too early for 
such a final assessment, since not all the damage can be known 
yet. But the Fukushima case again shows that a careful design of 
the compensation regime of catastrophic risks is important, not 
only in the light of providing adequate compensation for vic-
tims, but also as an instrument to provide incentives for preven-
tion. The mere fact that the Fukushima incident may have been 
caused not only by the operator's wrongful behaviour but prob-
ably by a design failure as well, again shows the problematic 
nature of an exclusive channelling of liability to the operator. 
Therefore excluding liability of all others who could have con-
tributed to the risk, such as those who designed the installation 
of the diesel generators for cooling pumps below the reactors, 
can create inefficient preventive incentives.
 
Studying the compensation for victims of the nuclear incident 
at Fukushima in Japan is therefore undoubtedly not only inter-
esting for those directly involved in the compensation of vic-
tims, but can provide yet another alert to the international com-
munity that the (inefficient) design of some of the international 
conventions needs to be seriously re-examined.
that there is no subsidy to the nuclear industry at all. The above 
description of the newly founded Nuclear Damage Compensa-
tion Facilitation Corporation shows that an ex post risk sharing 
agreement is established in Japan. In such a system, both TEP-
CO and other nuclear operators are asked to contribute to the 
Corporation, which helps and promotes compensation for nu-
clear victims. This seems similar to the US system where retro-
spective premiums are asked from operators. It is held that this 
system can give operators incentives to monitor each other and 
improve nuclear safety. At this stage it is not clear yet how the 
various nuclear operators will contribute to the Corporation. 
The system is, moreover, only established after the Fukushima-
incident took place. Hence, such an ex post system may fail to 
create incentives for nuclear operators for mutual monitoring. 
Besides, the government also helps the compensation through 
the issuance of government bonds and government guaranteed 
bonds. Those instruments can lead to a subsidy as well.
7. Concluding Remarks
 
The Fukushima incident which followed the 11 March 2011 
earthquake and tsunami will undoubtedly still be discussed for 
many years. A few days after the devastating tsunami it became 
clear that this tidal wave had caused the failure of the emergency 
diesel generators for the cooling system in the nuclear power 
plant at Fukushima, thus leading to a meltdown in various reac-
tors. Hence, Japan was confronted with a unique combination of 
a natural and a technological disaster with spectacular damage 
and thus questions concerning the compensation of victims.
 
Even though Japan never joined the international conventions, 
it can certainly not be argued that Japan would fall short of the 
level of protection awarded to victims via the international con-
ventions. On the contrary, it could even be held that the Japa-
nese model to compensate victims of nuclear accidents may 
provide lessons for the international community.
 
